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Direct-to-Consumer Calls to Action

1

LOWERING THE VOLUME OF CLAIMS AND
DISCLOSURES IN PRESCRIPTION DRUG
BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
Over several decades, prescription drug advertising in
the United States has evolved to target both physician and
patient audiences,2 across print, audio, and visual media,3
including interactive media on the internet.4 In 2016, the
pharmaceutical industry spent $6 billion on direct-to-consumer
(DTC) advertisements for prescription drugs, including a daily
average of over 1,800 television spots for an annual total of
663,000 commercials.5 These advertisements are subject to the
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) regulations.6
Companies that advertise a drug’s benefits must balance their
claims with risk disclosures in a manner that is not misleading,

1 Television commercials often contain “calls to action,” which prompt
interested consumers to follow up on the information they see in an advertisement by,
e.g., visiting the product’s website. Tom Goodwin, TV Advertising Is About to Change
Forever, ADAGE (Oct. 20, 2014), https://adage.com/article/digitalnext/tv-advertisingchange-forever/295465 [https://perma.cc/LH5V-2AAW].
2 Timothy M. Moore, Darshan Kulkarni & Emily T. Wright, Federal
Regulation of Advertising, Promotion, and Distribution Practices, in PHARMACEUTICAL
AND MEDICAL DEVICE LAW: REGULATION OF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND MARKETING
3-1, 3-15 (Michael E. Clark ed., BNA 2d ed. 2015). The United States is one of only two
countries that allow drug manufacturers to advertise to consumers, the other being New
Zealand. Beth Snyder Bulik, Doctors in New Zealand—The Only Non-U.S. Country that
Allows DTC Advertising—Call for Bans, FIERCEPHARMA (Mar. 20, 2017, 8:00 AM),
https://www.fiercepharma.com/marketing/doctors-new-zealand-only-other-countryallows-dtc-advertising-hate-it-too [https://perma.cc/JCE9-9D25].
3 AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER PRESCRIPTION DRUG
ADVERTISING 6 (2006).
4 Michael Friedman & James Gould, Consumer Attitudes and Behaviors
Associated with Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Marketing, 24 J. CONSUMER
MKTG. 100, 106 (2007).
5 Lisa M. Schwartz & Steven Woloshin, Medical Marketing in the United
States, 1997–2016, 321 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 80, 82 (2019).
6 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(n), 371(a) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 353c (2012 & Supp. I
2013); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2018).
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does not omit material facts, and directs consumers to
additional drug information.7
Drug companies, and many doctors, contend that DTC
advertisements facilitate meaningful discussions between
doctors and patients about their health, otherwise unknown
diagnoses, and available treatments.8 A 2004 study showed that
over the course of a year, more than sixteen million patients
requested a prescription for a drug after seeing its
advertisement.9 Many doctor visits prompted by DTC
advertising yield diagnoses of “high priority conditions such as
asthma, high blood pressure[,] or diabetes.”10
DTC advertisements, however, are increasingly perceived
as inadequate vehicles to communicate a drug’s benefits and
risks.11 These advertisements serve to inform and persuade
consumers, so they do not exclusively appeal to “rational
consideration of medical costs and benefits.”12 When an
advertisement highlights efficacy, it “can distort and inflate
consumers’ expectations about what prescription drugs can
accomplish.”13 Doctors commonly prescribe a specific drug at the
request of a patient, which suggests a possibly “artificial demand
for drugs” and a deterioration of the doctor-patient relationship.14
The FDA’s risk disclosure requirements also have given
rise to additional concerns about whether consumers
understand risk disclosures and whether risk disclosures
minimize dangerous risks.15 It is not immediately clear whether
7 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1), (5); Content of Risk Information in the Major
Statement in Prescription Drug Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements, 82 Fed.
Reg. 39,598, 39,599 (Aug. 21, 2017).
8 Victor E. Schwartz et al., Marketing Pharmaceutical Products in the TwentyFirst Century: An Analysis of the Continued Viability of Traditional Principles of Law in
the Age of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 351 (2009);
see also Friedman & Gould, supra note 4, at 106; Dominick L. Frosch et al., Creating
Demand for Prescription Drugs: A Content Analysis of Television Direct-to-Consumer
Advertising, 5 ANNALS FAM. MED. 6, 6 (2007).
9 AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, supra note 3, at 4.
10 Id.
11 Friedman & Gould, supra note 4, at 106.
12 Frosch et al., supra note 8, at 12; see also LEONARD J. WEBER, PROFITS BEFORE
PEOPLE?: ETHICAL STANDARDS AND THE MARKETING OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 168 (2006);
Joshua E. Perry et al., Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertisements and the Informed Patient:
A Legal, Ethical, and Content Analysis, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 729, 730 (2013).
13 Frosch et al., supra note 8, at 12. A viewer might even demand a prescription for a
specific brand-name medication, regardless of that patient’s diagnosis or that drug’s intended
use. Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 350–51. A recent update showed that pharmaceutical
DTC advertising practices in recent years have only exacerbated this problem. Janelle
Applequist & Jennifer Gerard Ball, An Updated Analysis of Direct-to-Consumer Television
Advertisements for Prescription Drugs, 16 ANNALS FAM. MED. 211, 214–16 (2018).
14 AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, supra note 3, at 10.
15 Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in Prescription Drug Directto-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements, 82 Fed. Reg. 39,598, 39,599 (Aug. 21, 2017).
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the dangerousness of a disclosed risk lies in its severity,
frequency, or both.16 Over-warning for any possible risk could
dilute the warnings for the most serious side effects.17 A related
concern is whether consumer confusion about possible adverse
events could result in “therapeutic noncompliance” with
prescriptions for otherwise safe drugs.18
Despite demands to ban the practice,19 DTC advertisements
persist as protected commercial speech.20 The existence of the
FDA’s DTC requirements, let alone compliance therewith, depends
on a fragile balance between drug manufacturers’ ability to
challenge them as overly broad speech restrictions and drug
manufacturers’ interests in FDA regulation.21 First, FDA
regulation and risk disclosures give credibility to DTC
advertisements by allowing consumers to assume that the
materials were thoroughly vetted.22 Second, the pharmaceutical
industry must consider how FDA requirements interact with its
liability exposure, should liability arise from “alleged flaws in
communicating information to individual patients.”23
The FDA, in recent years, has requested comments from
the public—the pharmaceutical industry, healthcare providers,
and consumers alike—on various iterations of a “limited risks
plus disclosure” approach to facilitate communication and
comprehension of drug risks in DTC advertisements.24 President
16 See Aaron D. Twerski, Liability for Direct Advertising of Drugs to
Consumers: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1149, 1153 (2005).
17 Kevin R. Betts et al., Serious and Actionable Risks, Plus Disclosure:
Investigating an Alternative Approach for Presenting Risk Information in Prescription
Drug Television Advertisements, 14 RES. SOC. & ADMIN. PHARMACY 951, 952 (2018); Niro
Sivanathan & Hemant Kakkar, The Unintended Consequences of Argument Dilution in
Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertisements, 1 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 797, 797 (2017).
18 Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in Prescription Drug
Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 39,599.
19 See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n, AMA Calls for Ban on DTC Ads of
Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.ama-assn.org/
content/ama-calls-ban-direct-consumer-advertising-prescription-drugs-and-medical-devices
[https://perma.cc/3YBR-X4VJ].
20 See infra Section I.C.
21 Cory L. Andrews & Wash. Legal Found., FDA-Mandated Listing of Drug
Prices in Ads Would Flunk Legal and Constitutional Tests, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2018, 10:45
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2018/08/27/fda-mandated-listing-of-drug-pricesin-ads-would-flunk-legal-and-aonstitutional-tests/ [https://perma.cc/VQ6M-AM6X].
22 See Joanne Kaufman, Think You’re Seeing More Drug Ads on TV? You Are,
and Here’s Why, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/24/
business/media/prescription-drugs-advertising-tv.html [https://perma.cc/9JSR-PA37].
23 See Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 354–55; see also infra Section II.C.
24 See Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in Prescription
Drug Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements, 82 Fed. Reg. 39,598, 39,599 (Aug.
21, 2017); Disclosure Regarding Additional Risks in Direct-to-Consumer Prescription
Drug Television Advertisements, 80 Fed. Reg. 1,637, 1,637 (Jan. 13, 2015); Disclosure
Regarding Additional Risks in Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Television
Advertisements, 79 Fed. Reg. 9,217, 9,218 (Feb. 18, 2014).
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Donald Trump has also demanded drug price disclosures in
these
advertisements,
which
the
FDA
considered
implementing.25 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) subsequently proposed a rule requiring price
disclosures in DTC advertisements for drugs on Medicare and
Medicaid formularies.26 Pharmaceutical companies then
threatened to challenge CMS’s proposed regulation as compelled
speech in violation of the First Amendment.27
The FDA’s recent attention to prescription drug DTC
broadcast advertisements shows an enduring focus on risk
disclosures. A thoughtful consideration of a broadcast
advertisement’s purpose and logistical constraints, as well as
recent calls for yet another disclosure rule, suggests that this
focus is too narrow. The FDA, instead, should regulate broadcast
advertisements as limited calls to action that prompt patients to
consult the print and electronic written components of a drug’s
advertising campaign, as well as a physician, for more detailed
and tailored information—and nothing more. This would allow
a manufacturer to disclose a drug’s approved indication in a
broadcast advertisement, but otherwise ban efficacy claims and
dramatically reduce the volume of required risk disclosures in
broadcast advertisements.28
This note proceeds in the following parts. Part I summarizes
the history of the FDA’s DTC advertising regulations and limits
thereto. Part II discusses how the current requirements foster both
inconsistent advertising practices in the pharmaceutical industry
and consumer confusion about drug risks that expose drug
manufacturers to potential liability. Part III explains why current
proposals are inadequate, in light of the broad problems with DTC
advertising that the FDA must address and attendant First
Amendment concerns. Finally, Part IV describes an alternative
approach of regulating broadcast advertisements as limited
vehicles within a broader advertising campaign and why Congress
and the FDA should implement this proposal.
25 Beth Snyder Bulik, Price Check at FDA: Trump Pushes for Pharma Ads with
Dollar Signs, FIERCEPHARMA (May 16, 2018, 9:26 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/
marketing/price-check-trump-administration-pushs-to-ad-drug-prices-to-pharma-ads
[https://perma.cc/3VED-UUC3].
26 Robert Pear, Trump Rule Would Compel Drug Makers to Disclose Prices in
TV Commercials, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/us/
politics/drug-industry-consumer-price-lists.html [https://perma.cc/H4FP-X339].
27 Id.; Andrews & Wash. Legal Found., supra note 21.
28 See Part IV. Federal law does not provide for such an expansive mediumbased restriction. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 353c (2012 & Supp. I 2013);
see also Part I. Proscriptions on DTC advertising practices that are broader in scope than
the FDA’s current authority would require congressional approval.
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THE FDA’S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE PRESCRIPTION
DRUG ADVERTISEMENTS

Congress passed the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act in 1938 to authorize the FDA to regulate prescription drug
safety and labeling.29 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
regulated all drug advertisements until 1962, when Congress
assigned prescription drug advertisements to the FDA.30
A.

The Rise of DTC Advertisements and Regulations

Pharmaceutical marketing practices initially targeted
doctors, because the FDA did not allow DTC advertisements for
prescription drugs until 1985.31 That year, the FDA authorized
DTC advertising that met the same “brief summary” and “fair
balance” requirements that applied to advertisements to
physicians.32 An advertisement’s benefit and risk information must
be “clear, conspicuous, and neutral.”33 It was not clear, however,
whether it was appropriate to regulate drug advertisements for
patients, who generally lack medical expertise and may be
vulnerable to misleading claims, under the same standards as for
physicians, who are trained to understand drug information.34
The FDA eventually issued a draft guidance in 1997 to
describe a voluntary “approach that sponsors can use to fulfill
the requirement for adequate provision for dissemination of the
approved package labeling in connection with consumer-directed
broadcast advertisements for [prescription drugs].”35 Broadcast
29 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, ch. 675, sec. 501–
05, 52 Stat. 1040, 1049–53 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 351–360n-1); Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, A Prescription for Drug Liability
and Regulation, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 138–39 (2005).
30 Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 339, 341; see also Drug Amendments of
1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, sec. 131, § 502(n), 76 Stat. 780, 791 (1962) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2012)). While the FTC retained jurisdiction over over-the-counter
drugs, the FDA later reaffirmed its jurisdiction over prescription drug advertisements
in 1971 to avoid any possible “duplication of work and to promote uniformity and
consistency of action.” Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Trade
Commission and the Food and Drug Administration, 36 Fed. Reg. 18,539, 18,539 (Sept.
16, 1971); see also 15 U.S.C. § 52 (2012). The implementing regulations for prescription
drug advertising are codified at 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2018).
31 Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs; Withdrawal of
Moratorium, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,677, 36,677 (Sept. 9, 1985); Schwartz et al., supra note 8,
at 344–45.
32 Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 345.
33 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2012).
34 Moore et al., supra note 2, at 3-15.
35 Draft Guidance for Industry; Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements,
62 Fed. Reg. 43,171, 43,172 (Aug. 12, 1997). The FDA finalized this guidance in 1999. See
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST
ADVERTISEMENTS (1999).
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advertisements could demonstrate compliance with the FDA’s
goal to reach the “most of a potentially diverse audience” by: (1)
airing a “major statement” about the drug’s key risks in the
audio portion; and (2) directing patients to readily accessible
places with the drug’s approved labeling for more information.36
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA) devised its own DTC advertising guidelines in
2005.37 An updated version of these guidelines, which took effect
in 2009, calls on companies to undertake internal efforts to
comply with the regulations,38 and includes a list of signatories
that the association updates every year.39 Some companies
pledged to restrict their DTC advertising practices by: (1)
observing moratoria on advertisements for a period of time after
they introduce a new drug to the market; (2) targeting specific
patients for certain therapies; or (3) submitting their advertising
campaigns for FDA approval.40 Since manufacturers voluntarily
restricted their advertising campaigns in different ways,
however, these efforts were not consistent throughout the
industry.41 Critics even contend that these guidelines “are,
perhaps purposefully, vague[,] . . . compliance with the guidelines
is voluntary[, and] . . . . the guidelines do not go far enough.”42
The FDA reconsidered its review process after a
subsequent influx of requests from drug companies for
comments on planned advertising campaigns.43 Given logistical
36 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED
BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS 2 (1999).
37 Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 347, 347 n.78. PhRMA is an industry
association that represents several major pharmaceutical manufacturers and serves as
a platform for members to self-regulate by certifying their commitments to PhRMA
principles. Members, PHARM. RES. & MFRS. OF AMERICA, https://www.phrma.org/about/
members [https://perma.cc/WSW4-SHTD]; PHARM. RES. & MFRS. OF AMERICA, PHRMA
GUIDING PRINCIPLES: DIRECT TO CONSUMER ADVERTISEMENTS ABOUT PRESCRIPTION
MEDICINES 7 (2018) [hereinafter PHRMA GUIDING PRINCIPLES 2018], http://phrma-docs.
phrma.org/files/dmfile/PhRMA_Guiding_Principles_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/MHS7-C4KM].
38 PHARM. RES. & MFRS. OF AMERICA, PHRMA GUIDING PRINCIPLES: DIRECT TO
CONSUMER ADVERTISEMENTS ABOUT PRESCRIPTION MEDICINES 4, 8 (2008), http://phrmadocs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/phrmaguidingprinciplesdec08final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/94EC-DPGE]. These principles were updated again in 2018 to reflect
the industry’s commitment to disclosing prices on drug websites. PHRMA GUIDING
PRINCIPLES 2018, supra note 37, at 6.
39 PhRMA Direct to Consumer Advertising Principles – Annual Certifications,
PHARM. RES. & MFRS. OF AMERICA (Aug. 27, 2017), http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/files/dm
file/2017-DTC-Compliance-Certifications-08-27-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NBX-MJ7B].
40 See AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, supra note 3, at 8 (describing some of the ways
that various drug manufacturers voluntarily modified their advertising practices
pursuant to PhRMA’s guiding principles).
41 See id.
42 Frosch et al., supra note 8, at 12.
43 AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, supra note 3, at 8; see also Schwartz et al., supra
note 8, at 348.
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constraints, it limited its review to advertisements for drugs in
certain situations. From a promotional perspective, the FDA
focused on advertisements for drugs that were featured in DTC
broadcasts for the first time.44 From a medical perspective, the
FDA reviewed a drug’s advertisements if it newly approved the
drug, if it approved the drug for a new use, or if there was new
benefit and risk information for the drug.45
B.

Recent Limits to the FDA’s Authority Over DTC
Advertisements

Congress expressly prohibited mandatory “prior
approval” of advertisements,46 except when the FDA determines
that a manufacturer omitted a drug’s important risk information
or recent approval date.47 The FDA may, however, require a
pharmaceutical company to submit a television advertisement
for review at least forty-five days before its first broadcast so
that the agency may recommend changes.48 If approved, presubmitted advertisements enjoy a “safe harbor” that gives the
manufacturer time to rectify any violations that may arise if the
FDA later reassesses the material unfavorably.49 The FDA’s
prereview recommendations, if any, put manufacturers on notice
of the position that the FDA likely will take when the initial
broadcast triggers the agency’s authority to require changes or
withdrawal.50 The FDA, otherwise, sees an advertisement only
upon release to the public.51
The FDA may threaten enforcement action in untitled
notices of violation and warning letters, as well as negative press,

AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, supra note 3, at 8.
Id.
46 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, sec. 131, § 502(n), 76 Stat.
780, 791–92 (1962) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2012)); Stephen D. Brody,
Navigating the Challenges Posed by the Current Enforcement Environment Facing Life
Sciences Companies, in INSIDE THE MINDS: UNDERSTANDING LEGAL TRENDS IN THE LIFE
SCIENCES INDUSTRY: LEADING LAWYERS ON COMPLYING WITH REGULATORY CHANGES
AND KEEPING ABREAST OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 21, 24 (Aspatore 2014).
47 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 11085, sec. 901, §§ 503b(c), (e), 121 Stat. 823, 939–40 (2007) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 353c(c), (e) (2012 & Supp. I 2013)); see also Brody, supra note 46, at 24.
48 21 U.S.C. §§ 353c(a)–(b).
49 Brody, supra note 46, at 24.
50 See Moore et al., supra note 2, at 3-7.
51 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(3)(i) (2018); Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 347; David
C. Vladeck, The Difficult Case of Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising, 41 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 259, 272 (2007); Prescription Drug Advertising: Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/Prescription
DrugAdvertising/ucm076768.htm [https://perma.cc/FAY7-CKQR].
44

45
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after an advertisement airs.52 The FDA may also condition, or
delay, other parts of the drug review process on the manufacturer’s
compliance with its prereview recommendations.53 Pharmaceutical
companies, who often are repeat players with more than one drug
in their portfolios, may therefore find it better for their bottom lines
to implement the FDA’s recommendations in their advertisements
and maintain a good relationship with the FDA, rather than ignore
or contest them as exceeding the FDA’s authority.54
C.

Constitutional Challenges to the FDA’s Regulation of
DTC Advertisements

Pharmaceutical companies can challenge the FDA’s
advertising regulations as an infringement on their First
Amendment speech rights.55 In Thompson v. Western States
Medical Center, where pharmacies sued the FDA over an
outright ban on advertisements for compounded drugs, the
Supreme Court struck down the FDA’s “provisions regarding
advertisement and promotion [as] unconstitutional restrictions
on commercial speech.”56 The regulation of commercial speech is
not necessarily unconstitutional, but to withstand scrutiny, it
must pass the Central Hudson test.57 There are four steps to the
Central Hudson test:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.
If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the

52 MARK HERRMANN & DAVID B. ALDEN, DRUG AND DEVICE PRODUCT LIABILITY
LITIGATION STRATEGY 20 (2012); Darshan Kulkarni & Emily T. Wright, Federal
Regulation of Advertising, Promotion, and Distribution Practices, in PHARMACEUTICAL
AND MEDICAL DEVICE LAW: REGULATION OF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND MARKETING
3-1, 3-5 (Michael E. Clark ed., BNA 2d ed. Supp. 2017); Lars Noah, Governance by the
Backdoor: Administrative Law(lessness?) at the FDA, 93 NEB. L. REV. 89, 124 (2014).
53 Noah, supra note 52, at 122–24.
54 Id.
55 Nathan
Cortez, Can Speech by FDA-Regulated Firms Ever Be
Noncommercial?, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 388, 388 (2011). Drug manufacturers’ advertising
practices appear to be protected commercial speech. Perry et al., supra note 12, at 734.
56 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002).
57 Id. at 367–68 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). The Supreme Court previously characterized a
state’s attempt to restrict a tobacco company’s manner of advertising, e.g., by requiring
cigarette advertisements to be placed higher than a child’s height, as a speech restraint
that triggered the Central Hudson test, not a “mere regulation of conduct” that triggered
lower scrutiny. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 567 (2001).
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regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.58

Although the Supreme Court’s post-Western States First
Amendment jurisprudence has not specifically addressed DTC
advertising, courts consistently apply the Central Hudson test to
the FDA’s regulation of drug manufacturers’ speech.59 Drug
advertisements generally meet the threshold prong because the
speech therein concerns prescription drug use, a lawful activity;60
although certain individual advertisements might be misleading,61
drug promotion itself “is not inherently misleading.”62
The FDA then must demonstrate a valid governmental
interest in regulating DTC advertisements, supported by
empirical evidence.63 This interest relates to patient access to
and comprehension of complete efficacy and risk information for
a drug, as well as preventing therapeutic noncompliance with a
prescription based on a misunderstanding of drug risks.64 While
courts look down on the FDA’s “paternalistic assumption” that
restrictions on drug promotion are “necessary to protect the
listener[s] from ignorantly or inadvertently misusing the
58 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980).
59 Alan Bennett et al., Back to First Principles: A New Model for the Regulation
of Drug Promotion, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 168, 175 (2015). It should be noted, however,
that recent Supreme Court rulings suggest that heightened scrutiny might replace the
Central Hudson test. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571–72 (2011);
Bennett et al., supra note 59, at 177–78 (explaining that the Sorrell court’s invalidation
of a speech restriction rested on the government’s failure to satisfy either the Central
Hudson test or heightened scrutiny); see also Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v.
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380–81 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing how the
majority’s failure to distinguish between commercial and non-commercial speech “at the
least threatens considerable litigation over the constitutional validity of much, perhaps
most, government regulation”); Cory L. Andrews & Wash. Legal Found., The Dog that
Didn’t Bark in the Night: SCOTUS’s NIFLA v. Becerra and the Future of Commercial
Speech, FORBES (July 5, 2018, 11:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2018/07/05/thedog-that-didnt-bark-in-the-night-scotuss-nifla-v-becerra-and-the-future-of-commercialspeech/ [https://perma.cc/77WY-LCP4] (explaining that the NIFLA court’s conflation of
commercial and non-commercial speech may lead to replacing Central Hudson’s
intermediate scrutiny with strict scrutiny).
60 See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 165 (2d Cir. 2012).
61 See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6)(i) (2018); Vladeck, supra note 51, at 272
(explaining that a DTC advertisement may be false or misleading when it omits a drug’s
safety risks or overstates its efficacy).
62 Bennett et al., supra note 59, at 174. The Second Circuit even carved out an
exception for off-label but truthful promotion of a drug, in which a manufacturer
advertises an FDA-approved drug for a non-approved use. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 168–69;
Brody, supra note 46, at 33.
63 George W. Evans & Arnold I. Friede, The Food and Drug Administration’s
Regulation of Prescription Drug Manufacturer Speech: A First Amendment Analysis, 58
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 365, 425–28 (2003).
64 Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in Prescription Drug
Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements, 82 Fed. Reg. 39,598, 39,599 (Aug. 21,
2017); Evans & Friede, supra note 63, at 426–27.
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information,” that criticism stems from the FDA’s conclusory
assumptions about its role in regulating promotional activity
that targets sophisticated healthcare professionals.65 Here, drug
manufacturers target unsophisticated consumers; empirical
evidence shows viewer confusion, so the FDA has commissioned
more studies to investigate the public’s ability to identify and
understand risk disclosures.66
The key takeaway for drug manufacturers is that
restrictions on DTC advertisements “will fail the fourth prong of
the Central Hudson test, unless there are no less restrictive
alternatives that could achieve the same objectives.”67 The
restriction must be tailored to the governmental interest in
regulating DTC advertisements in the first place.68 In practice,
courts routinely strike down restrictions on drug promotion that
are poorly tailored or overly broad.69 Recently proposed disclosure
requirements have also highlighted the fragile constitutional
foundation for the FDA’s current regulatory framework.70
II.

THE FDA NEEDS TO CHANGE THE DTC LANDSCAPE FOR
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

The current regulatory regime—a product of decades of
legislation, lobbying, and disputes—has created a contentious
environment that pits patient advocacy groups, physicians, drug
manufacturers, and government officials against each other,
even though they all consider public health among their goals.
The long-term interests of patients, doctors, pharmaceutical
companies, and the FDA demand reform.
A.

FDA Regulations Are Ineffective

The FDA’s regulations governing prescription drug
advertisements apply to advertisements appearing in publications
or broadcast over the radio or television.71 There are three kinds of
DTC advertisements: “product-claim” advertisements; “help65 Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 86 (D.D.C. 1999), appeal
dismissed, judgment vacated in part, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The D.C. Circuit
Court vacated the decision on separate grounds, explaining that the district court’s
reasoning was sound. Id. at 337 n.7.
66 See infra Section II.B.
67 Bennett et al., supra note 59, at 174–75.
68 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
69 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 580 (2011); Thompson v. W. States
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376 (2002).
70 See Andrews & Wash. Legal Found., supra note 21.
71 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(1) (2018).
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seeking” advertisements; and “reminder” advertisements.72
Pharmaceutical companies use product-claim advertisements to
identify a prescription drug and convey the benefits and risks of
using that drug.73 These companies may also use help-seeking
advertisements to convey information about a disease without
identifying any prescription drug, and reminder advertisements to
convey that a prescription drug is on the market without
identifying the drug’s purpose.74
Though the FDA monitors help-seeking and reminder
advertisements “to ensure there is no implication of a product
claim,” the FDA only regulates product-claim advertisements.75
Product claims are limited to medical uses that the FDA
previously approved in the manufacturer’s drug application.76
Specifically, the FDA currently requires that DTC drug
advertisements include: (1) a “major statement” in
advertisements that outlines “the advertised drug’s major side
effects and contraindications”; and (2) either a summary of side
effects and contraindications, or an “adequate provision” like a
toll-free number, print materials, or website address to
communicate those risks.77 The FDA also requires that a major
statement provide a “fair balance” of the benefits and risks of
taking a particular drug, and prohibits pharmaceutical
companies from misrepresenting, omitting, or misleading
consumers about a drug’s side effects, contraindications,
effectiveness, and possible outcomes after using a drug as
indicated.78 The regulations provide for a waiver of specific
requirements only on a case-by-case basis, upon “a showing that
the advertisement is not false, lacking in fair balance, or
otherwise misleading.”79
While the regulations elaborate on what kind of
information should go into the brief summary, drug manufacturers
have relied on a combination of the FDA’s guidance documents and
the industry’s own guidelines to ascertain what the regulations

Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 344.
Id.; see also Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in
Prescription Drug Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements, 82 Fed. Reg. 39,598,
39,599 (Aug. 21, 2017).
74 Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 344.
75 AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, supra note 3, at 5.
76 See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6)(i).
77 Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in Prescription Drug Directto-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 39,598; see 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1).
78 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(5); Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in
Prescription Drug Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 39,599.
79 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6).
72
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actually require.80 The deliberation, promulgation, and
enforcement of the FDA’s guidance documents are not subject to
the same controls that regulations and rules are, and the ability of
the FDA to unilaterally rescind or amend these guidelines makes
them vulnerable to the political atmosphere.81 This, in turn,
reduces the pharmaceutical industry’s ability to rely on the FDA to
understand what kind of risks manufacturers must disclose in
these advertisements.82
But for its authority to require manufacturers to redress
omissions of risk or recent approval information, the FDA may
only recommend changes to DTC advertisements before they are
broadcast; it may require other revisions only post hoc, i.e., after
potential patients would have already seen the advertisements.83
It is possible that, for a prereviewed submission, a manufacturer
would implement the FDA’s recommendation to avoid generating
a record of warning letters after the advertisement hits the air.84
Also at play is the FDA’s continuous oversight of drug
manufacturers, who must avoid unnecessarily antagonizing the
FDA to remain competitive.85 This influence, however, is not as
decisive and consistent as a codified set of requirements, because
it leaves too much about the appropriateness of the content of
DTC advertisements to guesswork and negotiation.86
Based on publicly available communications, the FDA has
not been especially active or consistent in policing DTC broadcast
80 See generally 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE
INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS (1999); Draft
Guidance for Industry on Direct-to-Consumer Television Advertisements; PreDissemination Review Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 14,811 (Mar. 13, 2012); PHRMA GUIDING
PRINCIPLES 2018, supra note 37, at 4–6.
81 Noah, supra note 52, at 97.
82 See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Comment
Letter on Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in Prescription Drug Directto-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements 7–9 (Nov. 20, 2017) [hereinafter PhRMA
Comment Letter], https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FDA-2017N-2936-0055&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/YSS9-CA5A].
83 21 U.S.C. § 353c(c) (2012 & Supp. I 2013) (explaining that “this section does
not authorize the [FDA] to make or direct changes” to the advertisement except in
limited circumstances); id. § 353c(e) (permitting the FDA to require changes to an
advertisement when the FDA determines that the manufacturer’s omission of a drug’s
risk or a drug’s recent approval date would be false or misleading); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1;
HERRMANN & ALDEN, supra note 52, at 20; WEBER, supra note 12, at 180–81. Absent
prereview, the FDA requires manufacturers to submit their DTC advertising materials
as soon as they air, after which the agency may require companies to fix ads that are
“false, lacking in fair balance, or otherwise misleading.” 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6); see also
supra Sections I.A–B.
84 See Moore et al., supra note 2, at 3-7.
85 See Noah, supra note 52, at 122–24.
86 Id. at 97, 122–24; see also Carl Tobias, FDA Regulatory Compliance
Reconsidered, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1028–29 (2008) (attributing judicial recognition
of a regulatory compliance defense, in part, to the FDA’s comprehensive and demanding
regulation); PhRMA Comment Letter, supra note 82, at 9–10.
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advertisements for prescription medications.87 A 2013 review of
the FDA’s enforcement activity in all forms of DTC advertising
showed a surprisingly low number of FDA notices of violation and
warning letters.88 That same review’s comparison of the
advertisements flagged by the FDA to ones that were not flagged,
revealed that the FDA missed several advertisements that the
authors determined to be misleading or imbalanced.89 An up-todate review of the FDA’s archived enforcement activity relating
to television commercials shows that the FDA sent nine letters to
pharmaceutical companies since 2007—seven untitled letters90
and two warning letters91—notifying manufacturers that these
commercials breached the regulations. This perhaps means that:
(1) drug manufacturers have demonstrated compliance in a vast
majority of commercials; (2) the FDA systematically underregulates
drug commercials for any number of reasons, e.g., understaffing;92
or (3) there is a disparity between what courts, the FDA,
manufacturers, and patients consider misleading.93

87 Perry et al., supra note 12, at 768. An advertisement may violate regulations
and air for months before the FDA sends a notice of violation or warning letter. WEBER,
supra note 12, at 159.
88 Perry et al., supra note 12, at 766–67.
89 Id. at 768.
90 Letter from Melinda McLawhorn, Team Leader, Office of Prescription Drug
Promotion, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Stacy Hennings, Senior Dir., Regulatory
Affairs, Advert. and Promotions, Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc. (May 18, 2017); Letter from
Melinda McLawhorn, Team Leader, Office of Prescription Drug Promotion, U.S. Food &
Drug Admin., to Joanne Robinett, Assoc. Vice President, N. Am. & Global Regulatory
Affairs, Sanofi-Aventis (Dec. 12, 2016); Letter from Matthew J. Falter, Team Leader,
Office of Prescription Drug Promotion, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Bhupesh Desai, Dir.,
Regulatory Affairs, Advert. and Promotion, Celgene Corp. (Dec. 12, 2016); Letter from
Carrie Newcomer, Regulatory Review Officer, Div. of Drug Mktg., Advert. and
Commc’ns, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Kathleen Grim, Exec. Dir. of Regulatory
Compliance, Sepracor Inc. (June 9, 2010); Letter from Sharon M. Watson, Regulatory
Review Officer, Div. of Drug Mktg., Advert. and Commc’ns, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
to Gary Wieczorek, Assoc. Dir., Regulatory Affairs, Eisai Med. Res. Inc. (Feb. 3, 2010);
Letter from Cynthia Collins, Consumer Safety Officer., Div. of Drug Mktg., Advert. and
Commc’ns, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Michelle M. Hardy, Senior Dir., U.S. Regulatory
Affairs, GlaxoSmithKline (Feb. 18, 2009); Letter from Carrie Newcomer, Consumer
Promotion Analyst, Div. of Drug Mktg., Advert. and Commc’ns, U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., to Janet A. Lorenz, Manager, Med./Regulatory Advert. & Promotion Grp.,
Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc. (Mar. 5, 2007).
91 Letter from Robert Dean, Dir., Div. of Consumer Drug Promotion, U.S. Food
& Drug Admin., to Ian C. Reed [sic], Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, Pfizer Inc. (May
24, 2012); Letter from Thomas Abrams, Dir., Div. of Drug Mktg., Advert., and Commc’ns,
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Reinhard Franzen, President and Chief Exec. Officer,
Bayer HealthCare Pharm., Inc. (Oct. 3, 2008).
92 See Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 351 n.99.
93 See Perry et al., supra note 12, at 768.
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Confusing Advertisements

Several physician and patient groups contend that DTC
advertising promotes inappropriate negotiations between a
patient and a doctor over treatment options.94 Some critics
believe that DTC advertisements are designed to build brand
loyalty or “selective demand.”95 Others go so far as to say that
drug companies’ advertisements “manipulate” consumers into
becoming their loyal customers,96 which, though cynical, reflects
the notion that ad campaigns must “focus on the obligation of
advertising to sell.”97 An advertisement, after all, is better able
to sell a drug’s benefits than to warn for its risks.98
There is a difference between generating consumer interest
in a drug to facilitate substantive medical conversations with
physicians, and generating consumer loyalty to a drug before a
patient consults complete information or a medical professional.99
Though supporters contend that these advertisements serve to
empower the patient, many pharmaceutical companies are
publicly-held corporations who have a duty to their shareholders
that would conflict with any duty to inform their customers.100 By
virtue of their dual purpose to inform and persuade consumers,
DTC advertisements do not exclusively appeal to “rational
consideration of medical costs and benefits.”101 A focus on optimal
outcomes, however, “can distort and inflate consumers’
expectations about what prescription drugs can accomplish.”102
The negative effects on patients who view these ads and
retain a distorted understanding of the benefits and risks of a
drug, and subsequently demand a prescription from their doctor,
may outweigh any informational benefit that DTC advertising
AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, supra note 3, at 10.
Perry et al., supra note 12, at 731 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96 WEBER, supra note 12, at 168; Daniel P. Richardson, Note, The Lost Child
of Products Liability: New Thoughts About Advertising and the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine, 27 VT. L. REV. 1017, 1041 (2003).
97 JON STEEL, TRUTH, LIES, AND ADVERTISING: THE ART OF ACCOUNT PLANNING
14 (1998) (emphasis and quotation omitted). Of course, “advertising works better when it
does not tell people what to think, but rather allows them to make up their own minds
about its meaning,” which leaves open a wide range of possibilities for a drug ad campaign,
but this is not a maxim that dictates whether an advertisement should rely on logical
persuasion or emotional connections. Id. at 6; see also WEBER, supra note 12, at 168.
98 Twerski, supra note 16, at 1152.
99 See Richardson, supra note 96, at 1047.
100 WEBER, supra note 12, at 162–63.
101 Frosch et al., supra note 8, at 12; see also WEBER, supra note 12, at 168;
Perry et al., supra note 12, at 730.
102 Frosch et al., supra note 8, at 12. A 2018 update showed that pharmaceutical
DTC advertising practices in recent years have only exacerbated this problem. Applequist
& Ball, supra note 13, at 214–16.
94
95
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provides.103 The FDA’s elaborate risk disclosure requirements
have given rise to concerns about “reduced consumer
comprehension, minimization of important risk information,
and, potentially, therapeutic noncompliance caused by fear of
side effects.”104 Including warnings for all possible side effects
could dilute warnings for the most serious side effects.105 One
study, therefore, concluded that most patients perceived DTC
advertisements as inadequate vehicles to communicate drug
risks and benefits.106 The less that the FDA does to regulate
these advertisements, the greater the potential becomes for both
harm to consumers and exposure to liability that drug
manufacturers face for alleged misrepresentations and
omissions in these advertisements.107
C.

Legal Consequences from Ineffective Regulations and
Confusing Advertisements

A patient who suffers an injury while using a prescription
drug may choose to sue the drug manufacturer under various
theories of products liability. A manufacturer’s marketing
campaign opens the door to failure to warn and misrepresentation
claims.108 A plaintiff who brings these claims must show that a drug
AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, supra note 3, at 10.
Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in Prescription Drug Directto-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements, 82 Fed. Reg. 39,598, 39,599 (Aug. 21, 2017).
105 Betts et al., supra note 17, at 952; Sivanathan & Kakkar, supra note 17, at 797.
106 Friedman & Gould, supra note 4, at 106.
107 See Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 354–55 (explaining that “close
regulation by the FDA and oversight by individual doctors appropriately preclude
holding pharmaceutical manufacturers liable for alleged flaws in communicating
information to individual patients”); see also David Lazarus, TV Commercials for
Prescription Drugs ‘Doing More Harm than Good’, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2018, 3:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la-fi-lazarus-direct-to-consumer-drug-ads-20
180410-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZN3A-4APZ]; Bronwyn Mixter, Less Risk Info in Rx
Drug Ads Could Cause Liability Issues, BNA (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.bna.com/lessrisk-info-n73014463442/ [https://perma.cc/T2HX-Z8S3].
108 HERRMANN & ALDEN, supra note 52, at 45, 60. A failure to warn claim arises
when a manufacturer fails to disclose the risks associated with a product, rendering the
product “unreasonably dangerous.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM.
LAW INST. 1965); HERRMANN & ALDEN, supra note 52, at 359. Using an objective standard,
a court determines whether the manufacturer’s warning is adequate. HERRMANN & ALDEN,
supra note 52, at 360. Relatedly, misrepresentation claims require a plaintiff to prove that:
(1) the company misrepresented or omitted a material fact; (2) the company knew or
believed its statement was false; (3) the plaintiff believed the company’s statement to be
true; (4) the company intended its statement to induce the plaintiff to act; and (5) the
plaintiff detrimentally relied on the company’s statement. Id. at 60. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts explains that this cause of action, which typically applies to
misrepresentations about the physical state of real property and chattels that implicate the
safety of their use, is “equally applicable to misrepresentation of other matters upon which
the safety of the person . . . depends,” including prescription drugs. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (emphasis added).
103
104
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manufacturer’s “misrepresentation was material, relied upon, and
a proximate or legal cause of the relevant injury.”109 When a DTC
advertisement allegedly omits risk information, the issue becomes
whether the advertisement appropriately influenced the patient to
act based on his or her expectations about the drug’s remedial
effects and adverse events.110 These claims are governed, and
generally precluded, by the learned intermediary doctrine, whose
demise would expose drug manufacturers to “expansive and
expensive . . . liability.”111 The FDA’s DTC advertising regulations
inform the legal doctrines that apply, in turn, when an injured
patient’s lawsuit implicates a drug’s DTC advertising campaign.112
1. Learned Intermediary Doctrine
The learned intermediary doctrine is a potent weapon
that forecloses a drug manufacturer’s liability to a patient for
failure to warn or misrepresentation when the company
adequately warned the patient’s prescribing physician.113 In
1998, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
acknowledged a possible exception to the doctrine when drug
manufacturers publish and broadcast DTC advertisements, but
the Restatement deferred to “developing case law” to determine
whether to recognize this as an actual exception to the
doctrine.114 The doctrine has survived most challenges based on
HERRMANN & ALDEN, supra note 52, at 61.
See id. at 60.
111 Twerski, supra note 16, at 1153.
112 Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 354 (explaining that “the learned
intermediary doctrine, regulatory compliance [defenses], and federal preemption” help
determine failure to warn liability). Since the Supreme Court has recognized DTC
advertising as permissible and protected commercial speech, drug manufacturers can
challenge the FDA’s regulations on First Amendment grounds. Thompson v. W. States
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002). It is, therefore, imperative to consider the legal
ramifications of the FDA’s regulations for products liability claims because these
consequences may factor into a manufacturer’s decision whether to contest the FDA’s
authority to regulate. See Y. Tony Yang & Brian Chen, Legal Considerations for Social
Media Marketing by Pharmaceutical Industry, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 39, 50 (2014); see
also Cortez, supra note 55, at 408.
113 JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., AARON D. TWERSKI & DOUGLAS A. KYSAR,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 435 (8th ed. 2016). Courts have agreed
that the physician—as someone without whom the patient would be unable to receive a
prescription, and as someone with the requisite medical training and contact with the
patient to make a calculated judgment about the appropriateness of certain treatment—
functions as an “informed intermediary.” See, e.g., Yates v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen
Pharms., Inc., 808 F.3d 281, 290 (6th Cir. 2015); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637
F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980); Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974).
Accordingly, the manufacturer’s duty to warn runs to the prescribing physician, but not
to the patient. Yates, 808 F.3d at 290.
114 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. e (AM. LAW
INST. 1998).
109
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current DTC practices, apart from rulings in New Jersey, West
Virginia, and New Mexico.115
In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., the New Jersey
Supreme Court created an exception to the learned intermediary
doctrine, assigning drug manufacturers that engage in DTC
advertising a corresponding duty to directly warn consumers as
well.116 The court explained that DTC advertisements mooted
several premises of the doctrine, namely that:
(1) reluctance to undermine the doctor patient-relationship [sic]; (2)
absence in the era of “doctor knows best” of need for the patient’s
informed consent; (3) inability of drug manufacturer to communicate
with patients; and (4) complexity of the subject; are all (with the
possible exception of the last) absent in the direct-to-consumer
advertising of prescription drugs.117

In so doing, the Perez court found that the learned intermediary
doctrine did not shield drug manufacturers who advertised
directly to consumers.118 West Virginia went even further in 2007
when its highest court wholly rejected the learned intermediary
doctrine as obsolete.119 In line with the Perez court’s rationale,
the court held that DTC advertising “obviates each of the
premises [of] the doctrine.”120
There are two key takeaways from these attacks on the
doctrine. First, no other states have replicated West Virginia’s
outright rejection of the learned intermediary doctrine or New
Jersey’s DTC advertising exception.121 To date, most courts have
not found that DTC advertising alters doctor-patient relationships
so much so that patients have direct and unilateral access to
prescription drugs, because prescription drugs still require
prescriptions from a learned intermediary.122 Nor has Congress
demonstrated any serious concerns about the possible harms of
115 See Keri L. Arnold, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: A Historical Review,
LAW360 (Oct. 16, 2014, 9:57 AM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/587180/thelearned-intermediary-doctrine-a-historical-review [http://perma.cc/NK86-856B].
116 Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1263 (N.J. 1999).
117 Id. at 1255. Even so, the court limited the fallout from this exception by
providing that the manufacturer may satisfy its duty to warn the consumer by complying
with federal advertising, labeling, and warning requirements. Id. at 1259; see also infra
Section II.B.2.
118 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1263.
119 State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 910 (W. Va. 2007).
120 Id.
121 HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 113, at 443. A federal district court in New
Mexico came close in a diversity case when it predicted that New Mexico state law would
reject the learned intermediary doctrine, but New Mexico’s highest court has not ruled
as much. Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1214–15 (D.N.M. 2008).
122 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795,
812 (E.D. Tex. 2002); Watts v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 365 P.3d 944, 950–51 (Ariz. 2016);
Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 372 S.W.3d 140, 163 (Tex. 2012).
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DTC advertising practices,123 aside from recent discussions about
price disclosures in these advertisements.124 Unless New Jersey or
West Virginia law applies, the learned intermediary doctrine
may void a claim that a DTC advertisement inadequately
communicated the risks of a drug to a patient.125
Second, New Jersey and West Virginia’s decisions about
the implications of DTC advertising for the learned intermediary
doctrine seem to have coincided with pivotal moments in the
evolution of the FDA’s regulatory authority over DTC
advertisements.126 In 1999, the FDA finalized guidance that
suggested manufacturers need only disclose a drug’s major risks,
rather than include an exhaustive brief summary.127 It is possible
that the Perez court’s ruling that same year was a knee-jerk
reaction to the resulting uptick in pharmaceutical advertising
practices.128 Similarly, West Virginia’s rejection of the doctrine in
2007 came in the same year that Congress defined limits to the
FDA’s prereview authority over DTC broadcast advertisements.129
West Virginia’s ruling was at least concurrent with an anxious
atmosphere that the FDA was not able to do enough to police the
information that patients received from pharmaceutical
companies outside of the doctor-patient relationship.130
Today, there is increased pressure on the learned
intermediary doctrine. First, the evolution of managed care has
decreased the availability of doctors to their patients, often
resulting in rushed conversations.131 Second, the rise of urgent

Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 349.
Robert Pear, What Big Pharma Fears Most: A Trump Alliance with Democrats
to Cut Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/20/us/
politics/trump-pharmaceutical-industry-healthcare.html [http://perma.cc/Q2VX-YG3N].
125 See, e.g., Watts, 365 P.3d at 950–51 (explaining that New Jersey’s and West
Virginia’s DTC exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine have not gained traction).
126 Cf. Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 349 (explaining that early developments
of drug regulation were reactions to public safety concerns about prescription drugs).
127 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED
BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS 1 (1999); Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 345.
128 Corey Schaecher, Comment, “Ask Your Doctor If This Product Is Right for
You”: Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and the Future
of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine in the Face of the Flood of Vioxx® Claims, 26 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 421, 429 (2007).
129 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 11085, sec. 901, § 503b, 121 Stat. 823, 939 (2007) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 353c
(2012 & Supp. I 2013)).
130 See Noah, supra note 52, at 134.
131 Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1255 (N.J. 1999).
123
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care clinics132 and telemedicine133 raises questions about the
substance of doctor-patient relationships in such abbreviated
and remote circumstances, respectively, especially when doctors
offer prescriptions on demand to patients they have never met.134
Third, consumers’ online access to a drug’s official website and
the rise of social media, as well as the FDA’s abundance of recent
guidelines and proposals for online DTC practices,135 present
other
convenient
avenues
for
interactions
between
manufacturers and patients.136 These new frontiers, combined
with DTC practices generally, suggest that courts soon may
revisit the question of a manufacturer’s duty to warn the
patient.137 If courts abrogate the learned intermediary doctrine,
manufacturers must rely on other strategies, like regulatory
compliance and preemption, to defend their DTC practices.
2. Regulatory Compliance
The current regime also hinders a drug manufacturer’s
ability to assert regulatory compliance as a defense.138
Compliance defenses have merit where the regulation in
question is recent and reflects a current standard that is
relevant and probative of the claim.139 That standard should
reflect “substantial expertise” and result from “full, fair, and
thorough” deliberation.140 Where a plaintiff alleges deceptive
advertising of FDA-approved products, some courts have
132 Reed Abelson & Julie Creswell, The Disappearing Doctor: How Mega-Mergers
Are Changing the Business of Medical Care, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/04/07/health/health-care-mergers-doctors.html [http://perma.cc/P3AZ-3PS6].
133 Melinda Beck, How Telemedicine Is Transforming Health Care, WALL ST. J.
(June 26, 2016, 10:10 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-telemedicine-istransforming-health-care-1466993402 [https://perma.cc/QE87-BBXR].
134 Id.
135 See, e.g., Internet/Social Media Platforms with Character Space Limitations:
Presenting Risk and Benefit Information for Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices; Draft
Guidance for Industry, 79 Fed. Reg. 58,357 (Sept. 29, 2014); see also Internet/Social Media
Platforms: Correcting Independent Third-Party Misinformation About Prescription Drugs
and Medical Devices; Draft Guidance for Industry, 79 Fed. Reg. 58,359 (Sept. 29, 2014).
136 See, e.g., Gilead Sciences, Inc., Comment Letter on Content of Risk
Information in the Major Statement in Prescription Drug Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast
Advertisements 2 (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?
documentId=FDA-2017-N-2936-0056&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [http://
perma.cc/SE8S-XRVL] (calling on the FDA to allow drug manufacturers to use social
media, product websites, and other digital avenues to supplement risk disclosures).
137 Yang & Chen, supra note 112, at 50; Arnold, supra note 115.
138 Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK.
L. REV. 839, 901–02 (2009) (explaining that the compliance defense is generally
unavailable in the DTC context, “unless courts [understand] the manner in which agency
expectations operate as de facto requirements”).
139 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4 cmt. e (AM. LAW
INST. 1998).
140 Id.
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considered the drug approval process to be “conduct that is
closely regulated . . . [and] beyond the scope of more general
state statutes prohibiting deceptive advertising.”141
Several states recognize a regulatory compliance defense142
via statute,143 their courts,144 or both.145 This defense creates
rebuttable presumptions about drug safety and adequacy of
warnings,146 or otherwise limits or altogether precludes punitive
damages against drug manufacturers who demonstrate good faith
compliance with FDA requirements.147 A plaintiff’s burden of proof
to rebut this presumption may be so high that a court may dismiss
a failure to warn claim on the merits.148 Most jurisdictions,
however, do not recognize regulatory compliance as dispositive,
since FDA regulations function as floors for corporate conduct.149
One problem with invoking a regulatory compliance
defense against failure to warn and misrepresentation claims is
that the FDA’s DTC advertising regulations are “outdated.”150
These requirements have not been subjected to full regulatory
scrutiny since before 1997, when the FDA issued a draft of its first
DTC advertising guidance.151 Since 1997, the FDA’s regulations for
prescription drug DTC advertisements have only been updated

Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 371–72.
Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 29, at 174–76.
143 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927
(West 1987).
144 See, e.g., Brown v. Super. Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 482–83, 483 n.12 (Cal. 1988)
(concluding that “a manufacturer is not strictly liable for injuries caused by a prescription
drug so long as the drug was properly prepared and accompanied by warnings” and
explaining that the FDA closely regulates the standards for drug manufacturing and
labeling); Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1259 (N.J. 1999) (explaining that
“absent deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of after-acquired knowledge of harmful
effects, compliance with FDA standards should be virtually dispositive of such claims”).
145 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-703 (West 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B8-203 (West 2008), invalidated in part as preempted by Grange, Jr. v. Mylan Labs., Inc.,
No. 1:07-CV-107 TC, 2008 WL 4813311 (D. Utah Oct. 31, 2008); Grundberg v. Upjohn
Co., 813 P.2d 89, 99 (Utah 1991).
146 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (creating a rebuttal presumption of the
adequacy of a manufacturer’s warnings after FDA approval); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6703 (creating a rebuttable presumption that a product prepared in compliance with
government regulations is “free from . . . defect”).
147 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927 (precluding punitive damage awards against a drug
manufacturer when the FDA reviewed and approved the drug and its label); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-8-203 (precluding punitive damage awards where the alleged harm stemmed
from a drug that the FDA approved and “recognized as safe and effective”).
148 In re Accutane Litig., No. 079933, 2018 WL 4761403, at *26–28 (N.J. Oct. 3,
2018) (dismissing 532 plaintiffs’ claims for failure to warn where the plaintiffs “failed to show
any of [three] bases for overcoming the presumption of adequacy” of FDA-approved warnings).
149 Tobias, supra note 86, at 1017–18. Where it is asserted, this defense tends to factor
into jury deliberations. Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 369-70; Tobias, supra note 86, at 1019.
150 Bennett et al., supra note 59, at 170.
151 See Draft Guidance for Industry; Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements,
62 Fed. Reg. 43,171, 43,171 (Aug. 12, 1997); see also Noah, supra note 52, at 97–98.
141
142
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once, pursuant to the FDA Amendments Act of 2007, and that
update was directed at animal drugs, not human medications.152
Another concern with a regulatory compliance defense is
that courts might not be willing to extend the protections of de
jure rules to the FDA’s “de facto requirements.”153 For example,
the FDA’s recent requirements do not reflect the “full, fair, and
thorough” deliberation that must inhere in a governing standard,
because the agency relies on guidance documents.154 On paper,
guidance documents are subject to a public comment period and
enable the FDA to respond quickly to scientific advances, so they
appear to be products of a deliberative process, as well as reflect
recency.155 The abbreviated nature of this deliberative process,
however, pales in comparison to the intensity of promulgation of
other administrative law, like regulations and rules.156
It also is unclear if the FDA can even enforce de facto
requirements because guidance documents are not binding.157 Nor
is it a secret that the FDA lacks the capacity to exhaustively police
all advertisements.158 The FDA’s determination of compliance
then might be the result of politicking with regulated entities,
which undermines the availability of its requirements as a
baseline legal standard for a compliance defense.159

152 See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2018); Index of Legally Marketed Unapproved New
Animal Drugs for Minor Species, 72 Fed. Reg. 69,108, 69,119 (Dec. 6, 2007).
153 Noah, supra note 138, at 901–02.
154 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4 cmt. e (AM. LAW
INST. 1998); Noah, supra note 52, at 113–14.
155 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4 cmt. e (AM. LAW
INST. 1998); Noah, supra note 52, at 101–02, 119.
156 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012); Noah, supra note 52, at 101–02. Although, for
example, the FDA publishes draft guidance documents for public comment, it “need [not]
offer detailed responses to public comments” nor defend its positions therein against
“close scrutiny by the other two branches of government.” Noah, supra note 52, at 102.
157 Guidance documents include a disclaimer that the FDA’s recommendations
are not binding. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PRODUCT NAME PLACEMENT, SIZE,
AND PROMINENCE IN PROMOTIONAL LABELING AND ADVERTISEMENTS: GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY 1 (2017).
158 Reuven Blau, FDA Sends Record Low Number of Warnings to Drugmakers
Found Lying in Ads, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 11, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/
news/national/record-number-fda-warnings-drugmakers-lie-ads-article-1.3690161
[http://perma.cc/MBM8-MDFF].
159 Noah, supra note 52, at 132–34. The FDA’s reliance on guidance documents
has given rise to informal enforcement mechanisms, where guidelines are binding
insofar as the FDA is able to induce voluntary compliance. Id. at 122–24. Congress tried
to rectify this legitimacy problem by declaring the FDA’s guidelines to be authoritative,
but legislators have not extended this authority to other federal agencies. Id. at 109–10.
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3. Preemption
A related concern is the availability of the preemption
doctrine in the DTC advertising context.160 Preemption occurs in
one of three ways: (1) express preemption, where Congress
explicitly provides for federal law to supersede state law on a
particular matter;161 (2) implied conflict preemption, where state
and federal law either directly conflict with each other to make
it impossible to comply with both legal regimes or where state
law is an obstacle that frustrates Congress’s intentions behind a
particular federal law;162 and (3) implied field preemption, where
federal law occupies an entire field of regulation, leaving no
room for state law to simultaneously govern this area.163
A drug manufacturer’s ability to invoke preemption in a
failure to warn or misrepresentation claim depends on the extent
to which the FDA monitors and polices advertisements and
whether there are codified standards that such advertisements
must satisfy.164 At the outset, Congress granted the FDA the
authority to review DTC advertising “implicitly by prohibiting
misbranding.”165 This moots express preemption because Congress
did not explicitly preclude state law claims or parallel heightened
state law requirements relating to DTC advertising practices.166
Conflict preemption likewise may be beyond reach,
because the Supreme Court set a high bar for impossibility for
dual compliance with federal and state standards that is
currently lacking in the DTC context.167 There is no direct conflict
between FDA regulations and a state law claim, because the
FDA’s authority to require changes pursuant to a prereview is
limited to adding risk disclosures and FDA approval dates for new
drugs.168 The scope of FDA regulations as ceilings on corporate
160 Litigants have contested implied conflict preemption in claims involving
prescription drugs. Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 379. Field preemption might also be
available in the DTC context with an eye to the FDA’s “primary responsibility for [this]
issue.” HERRMANN & ALDEN, supra note 52, at 341.
161 HERRMANN & ALDEN, supra note 52, at 318.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 318–19.
164 Compare 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2012) and 21 U.S.C. § 353c (2012 & Supp. I
2013) with Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578–79 (2009) (explaining that preemption is
not available by default and “manufacturers, not the FDA, bear primary responsibility
for their drug labeling”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 4 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1998); Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 386.
165 Moore et al., supra note 2, at 3-14.
166 HERRMANN & ALDEN, supra note 52, at 335.
167 Levine, 555 U.S. at 590–91 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that the
Court’s impossibility standard is so narrow that it is possible for federal and state law
requirements to directly conflict with each other without being impossible to
demonstrate compliance with both); HERRMANN & ALDEN, supra note 52, at 339.
168 21 U.S.C. § 353c(e).
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conduct, and whether they would trigger a conflict, is unclear.169
As for obstacle preemption and field preemption, it is difficult to
defer to the FDA’s decision-making process and regulatory goals
when it does not have sufficient power to require changes to an
advertisement before it reaches consumers170 and it has not
demonstrated a reliable capability of policing every DTC
advertisement.171 A lack of preemption gives rise to a liability
nightmare in which varying standards of care for DTC
advertisements emerge from fifty state tort regimes and federal
regulatory provisions.172
III.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS DO TOO LITTLE OR GO TOO FAR

A reformulation of the FDA’s oversight of DTC drug
advertisements should account for both the public health interest
in adequately informed consumers and pharmaceutical companies’
right to communicate with prospective patients. Recent proposals,
however, have not successfully balanced these considerations.
A.

The FDA’s “Limited Risks Plus Disclosure” Proposals
Fall Short

On August 21, 2017, the FDA proposed to limit required
disclosures to risks “that are severe (life-threatening), serious, or
actionable, coupled with a disclosure to alert consumers that there
are other product risks not included in the advertisement.”173 The
proposal retains the fair balance requirement, even in instances
when medications do not have severe, serious, or actionable
risks.174 Some commenters supported reform, but criticized the
169 Levine, 555 U.S. at 575; Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 380–81. In Wyeth
v. Levine, the Court withheld preemption because it identified a technicality in the FDA’s
regulations that allowed a manufacturer to strengthen a drug warning without prior
approval from the FDA, even though such a change would still be subject to later review
and approval by the FDA. Levine, 555 U.S. at 575.
170 21 U.S.C. § 353c; WEBER, supra note 12, at 180–81.
171 Perry et al., supra note 12, at 768; WEBER, supra note 12, at 160.
172 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4 cmt. e (AM.
LAW INST. 1998); Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 380.
173 Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in Prescription Drug Directto-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements, 82 Fed. Reg. 39,598, 39,599 (Aug. 21, 2017).
Severe risks are serious risks that are also life-threatening; serious risks may require
hospitalization, cause prolonged disability or incapacity, cause congenital anomalies or
birth defects, or otherwise jeopardize the patient or require surgical intervention; and
actionable risks are those that a patient can identify and act upon to mitigate its effects.
Id. In 2014, the FDA categorized risks in a similar “limited risks plus disclosure” approach
as “serious and actionable.” Disclosure Regarding Additional Risks in Direct-to-Consumer
Prescription Drug Television Advertisements, 79 Fed. Reg. 9,217, 9,218 (Feb. 18, 2014).
174 Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in Prescription Drug
Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 39,599. For medications
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FDA’s sudden recalibration of drug risk categories as confusing for
the pharmaceutical industry, doctors, and consumers.175 Others
lamented that the proposal fell short of full transparency to
patients and called for simultaneous audio and video disclosure of
all important risks without any accompanying distractions.176
Other critics insisted on a ban on all DTC advertising.177
Consumers and industry need the FDA to revolutionize its
broadcast disclosure requirements. The FDA’s current “limited
risks plus disclosure” proposal and past iterations thereof fall
short of fixing the current regulatory regime’s tendency to allow
or overlook commercials that generate consumer confusion about
risk disclosures.178 The FDA’s 2017 proposal identifies
hierarchical categories for risks that drug manufacturers must
still disclose individually,179 so it would not substantially change
what drug commercials look and sound like.180 Adding to the mix
are the FDA’s subsequent recommendations on describing
benefits and risks, which “apply to DTC promotional
materials . . . regardless of the medium in which they are

that do not have severe, serious, or actionable risks, a major statement must still strike
a balance in its communication of a drug’s benefits and risks. Id.
175 See PhRMA Comment Letter, supra note 82, at 8–9 (asserting that the “FDA
did not acknowledge, address, or explain the change in its position” on required risk
disclosures and how to categorize them). The new “severe” risk category is also
inconsistent with the drug safety reporting terminology that the industry uses. Id. at 9;
Eli Lilly & Co., Comment Letter on Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement
in Prescription Drug Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements 4 (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FDA-2017-N-2936-0053&
attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [http://perma.cc/Q9XV-VQ2L] (arguing that
the FDA’s new “severe” risk category is not defined in the regulations and “will face
significant implementation challenges by industry as well as consistency issues”).
176 Public Citizen, Comment Letter on Content of Risk Information in the Major
Statement in Prescription Drug Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements 10–11
(Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FDA-2017N-2936-0054&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [http://perma.cc/K7UZ-YQ3X].
177 Id. at 4–5.
178 Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in Prescription Drug
Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 39,599; Disclosure
Regarding Additional Risks in Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Television
Advertisements, 79 Fed. Reg. at 9,218.
179 Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in Prescription Drug
Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 39,599. In a comment, a
consumer advocacy group proposed that the FDA require full disclosure of the important
risks of a drug in DTC advertisements with emphasis on more serious risks. Public
Citizen, supra note 176, at 10.
180 Compare 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(3)(iii) (2018) (requiring advertisements to
“disclose each specific side effect and contraindication” of the advertised drugs) with
Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in Prescription Drug Direct-toConsumer Broadcast Advertisements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 39,599 (describing the “major
statement” and “adequate provision” for risk disclosure before defining possible ways to
categorize major side effects); see also Eli Lilly & Co., supra note 175, at 2; Public Citizen,
supra note 176, at 1.
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presented.”181 Research, however, shows that any interest in
facilitating consumer comprehension and redirecting information
exchanges between pharmaceutical companies and patients away
from the broadcast platform is poorly met by detailed disclosure
requirements for broadcast platforms.182 Other proposed
overhauls that leave the FDA’s DTC regulations untouched do not
go far enough either and fall victim to the same criticisms.183
Nor do the modified risk disclosures do enough for drug
manufacturers’ business and litigation interests to dissuade their
First Amendment challenges. From a constitutional standpoint,
given their similarity, the FDA’s proposals suffer from the same
concerns about Central Hudson’s fourth prong as does the existing
framework.184 These proposals’ failure to effectively address the
core concern—inability of the broadcast platform to adequately
convey efficacy and risk information—likewise threatens to
undermine the credibility of broadcast advertisements.185 Those
advertisements will not alleviate the pressure that evolving DTC
practices stand to exert on the learned intermediary doctrine, since
the basis of that pressure lies in the effect of the broadcasts on
patients and doctor-patient relationships.186
The FDA’s proposal also does little to improve the
prospects of preemption and regulatory compliance in the DTC
context because the contemplated risk disclosures leave the
FDA’s problematic regulatory framework intact.187 As
commenters pointed out, the FDA has not promulgated new
181 Presenting Quantitative Efficacy and Risk Information in Direct-toConsumer Promotional Labeling and Advertisements; Draft Guidance for Industry, 83
Fed. Reg. 52,484, 52,485 (Oct. 17, 2018).
182 See supra Section II.B.
183 See, e.g., Bennett et al., supra note 59, at 201–12 (advocating that drug
manufacturers’ speech be categorized on a spectrum of increasing FDA regulation,
exempting noncommercial scientific exchanges from the FDA’s scrutiny on one end,
while subjecting communications that induce “an immediate commercial transaction
involving the drug,” including DTC advertisements, to the “existing regulatory
framework”). Absent a change to DTC regulations in particular, current problems with
consumer-facing advertisements would continue unabated.
184 See supra Section I.C (explaining the fourth prong’s requirement that a
speech restriction be narrowly tailored to the underlying governmental interest).
185 Commenters even argued that the broadcast platform is inherently
incapable of adequately informing a consumer, because the viewer has a mere moment
to comprehend highly scientific and condensed information before other programming
commands his or her attention instead. Ass’n of Magazine Media, Comment Letter on
Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in Prescription Drug Direct-toConsumer Broadcast Advertisements 10–11 (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/
contentStreamer?documentId=FDA-2017-N-2936-0051&attachmentNumber=1&content
Type=pdf [http://perma.cc/XS5P-93ZB].
186 See AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, supra note 3, at 9.
187 See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the
FDA’s lack of formal rulemaking and increasing reliance on non-binding guidance
documents and other informal processes).
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regulations for DTC broadcast advertisements pursuant to the
FDA Amendments Act of 2007, instead issuing notices of proposed
rulemaking or requests for comments (that it did not implement)
and resorting to guidance documents.188 Importantly, the
pharmaceutical industry expressed concern about the FDA’s
unilateral and unsubstantiated reformulation of the risk
categories, as compared to its 2014 proposal.189 Such flexibility of
the FDA’s process to issue guidelines allows it to stay current, but
this comes at the expense of full regulatory scrutiny, which
compromises a regulatory compliance defense.190 This proposal
also fails to satisfy Levine’s high bar for preemption, which, in the
absence of Congress’s express statutory provision preempting
state law, requires that it truly be impossible for a manufacturer
to comply with both federal and state law.191 Here, the FDA
continues to lack codified authority to require anything other
than additional risk disclosures and a new drug’s FDA approval
date in drug commercials before they reach the consumer, which
leaves room for state law standards, and even other federal
agencies, to require other disclosures.192
The FDA’s proposal, therefore, does not adequately
confront state law liability either. Given the potential for
liability—due to the questionable prospects for preemption and
unavailability of the regulatory compliance defense in the
current DTC context, as well as increased pressure on the
learned intermediary doctrine—it would be in the drug
industry’s best interest for the FDA to find another solution.
B.

A Ban on DTC Advertisements Would Be
Unconstitutional

Opponents of DTC drug advertisements would be unable
to defend a ban on these ads from a constitutional challenge. One
such opponent, the American College of Physicians (ACP),
argues that the practice “undermines the patient-physician
relationship” and “confuse[s] and misinform[s]” patients.193 The
American Medical Association,194 as well as advocacy groups like
See, e.g., Public Citizen, supra note 176, at 3–4.
PhRMA Comment Letter, supra note 82, at 8–9. The industry was surprised
to see that the FDA expanded the required risk disclosure from serious and actionable
risks to severe, serious, or actionable risks, when the FDA’s most recently concluded
study of DTC advertisements examined serious and actionable risks only. Id.
190 See supra notes 153–156 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 164–169 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 25–27, 168–169 and accompanying text.
193 AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, supra note 3, at 2.
194 Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n, supra note 19.
188

189
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Public Citizen, similarly oppose DTC advertising practices as
harmful to patients.195 These organizations prefer that the
practice be banned altogether.196 Other critics support a limited
ban on DTC broadcast advertisements in particular, while
leaving other forms of drug promotion intact.197 And yet other
critics propose that drug manufacturers observe moratoria for
new drugs “to permit physicians and the agency to assess
whether the newly-sold drugs pose risks” that clinical trials
might fail to uncover.198
Regardless of the legitimacy of such concerns, commercial
speech jurisprudence suggests that neither a moratorium, nor an
outright ban, would survive a First Amendment challenge.199
Central Hudson protects DTC advertisements as commercial
speech if the speech is lawful and is not misleading, and if a ban
would exceed what is necessary to serve the government’s interest
of protecting patients.200 The Supreme Court has expressed its
preference for “the far less restrictive alternative” of simply
requiring drug manufacturers to disclose a drug’s risks instead
of preventing manufacturers from advertising to patients at
all.201 Furthermore, the law already protects consumers from
advertisements that unlawfully contravene the FDA’s
regulatory process, if manufacturers disregard the FDA’s
warnings about omissions from their ads202 or advertise the drug
for uses beyond the set of indications for which the FDA has
already approved the drug.203
In essence, courts are “hostil[e] to categorical restraints
denying consumers information about lawful products.”204 A
regulation targeting DTC advertisements, or broadcasts in
particular, should address concerns about consumer confusion
Public Citizen, supra note 176, at 4–5.
AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, supra note 3, at 2; Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n,
supra note 19; Public Citizen, supra note 176, at 4–5.
197 Vladeck, supra note 51, at 284.
198 Margaret Gilhooley, Drug Regulation and the Constitution After Western
States, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 901, 921 (2003); see also SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R40590, DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 32 (2009).
199 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376 (2002); see Margaret
Gilhooley, Drug Safety and Commercial Speech: Television Advertisements and Reprints
on Off-Label Uses, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 845, 848 (2010) (explaining that “the Court’s
rationale raises a constitutional question about the permissibility of a moratorium on
DTC advertisements or other speech restrictions for drugs”); Mark I. Schwartz, To Ban
or Not to Ban—That Is the Question: The Constitutionality of a Moratorium on Consumer
Drug Advertising, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 18 (2008).
200 See supra Section I.C.
201 W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. at 376.
202 21 U.S.C. § 353c(e) (2012 & Supp. I 2013).
203 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6)(i) (2018).
204 Vladeck, supra note 51, at 287.
195

196
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without blocking an entire channel of communication between
the drug manufacturer and the consumer.
IV.

DTC BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS AS LIMITED CALLS
TO ACTION

Congress should expand the FDA’s authority to regulate
prescription drug claims and disclosures in DTC broadcast
advertisements, and the FDA should promulgate implementing
regulations, as follows: (1) permit drug manufacturers to
identify the drug and the class of patients the drug would treat
in a commercial, but otherwise disallow the mention of any other
benefits of a drug; (2) determine consumer-friendly risk
categories to organize safety information from the drug’s label
and identify the category names as the sole vocabulary for a
commercial’s risk disclosure;205 and (3) retain the “adequate
provision” requirement, directing the patient to various
resources where the drug’s approved labeling is available,
including the drug’s official website, “an operating toll-free
telephone number,” “print advertisements,” and prescribing and
dispensing healthcare professionals.206 For the sake of argument,
this note adopts the risk categorizations that the FDA recently
proposed—severe, serious, and actionable.207 When compared to
the current framework for DTC drug advertisements, this
proposal will yield restricted product claims208 by limiting benefit
information to a drug’s intended treatment and balancing that
with a warning about the applicable groups of drug risks.209

205 Similar to the FDA’s attention to risk signals, this proposal suggests that in DTC
broadcast advertisements, risk categorizations should strike a balance between generality
and specificity; whatever that balance may be, the commercial’s disclosure of the relevant
risk categories should not include a list of the drug’s specific risks. See Content of Risk
Information in the Major Statement in Prescription Drug Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast
Advertisements, 82 Fed. Reg. 39,598, 39,600 (Aug. 21, 2017); cf. Eli Lilly & Co., supra note
175, at 5–6 (requesting more specific risk categories than the three that the FDA proposed
and showing how DTC commercials rely on risk information from product labeling).
206 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS 2–3 (1999).
207 Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in Prescription Drug
Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 39,599.
208 See Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 344.
209 The FDA does not allow drug manufacturers to group drug risks without
permission from the FDA during the approval process or labeling review. 21 C.F.R.
§ 202.1(e)(3)(iii)(b). It is, therefore, imperative that the FDA codify certain risk groupings
for DTC advertising purposes to satisfy this requirement.
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What Viewers Will See and Hear

A DTC commercial in this framework for a drug (“X”) that
treats a condition (“Y”) and has serious and actionable risks
might look this:
Have you been living with Y? This message is for you. X is FDAapproved to treat patients with Y. X is also associated with serious and
actionable risks, so talk to your doctor about X and Y and see our website,
www.X.com, for more information about X’s benefits and risks.210

This format, upon codification, facilitates consumer understanding
and nationwide drug advertising standards by simplifying the
framework and cementing them as requirements, rather than
recommendations in a guidance document.211 The advertisements
are also purposefully general when making an efficacy claim—that
the drug treats a certain condition—and when describing the
groups of risks that have been observed in patients using the drug.
This generality will induce consumers to treat broadcast
commercials as calls to action, not to buy a brand medication, but
to trigger conversations with doctors and research on print and web
platforms, where explanations of a drug’s benefits and risks can be
much more comprehensive.212
In the interest of both business and patients’ rights, the
FDA should utilize broadcast regulations to promote a shift to
web and print advertisements. Print advertisements and online
content are better vehicles for specific benefit and risk
information, because they are flexible platforms that give
patients an opportunity to review a drug’s materials on their
own time and at their own pace.213 A regulation that strictly
limits the content of a DTC broadcast advertisement and
requires manufacturers to direct potential patients to consult
more comprehensive platforms like a magazine or a drug’s

210 This proposal lends itself well to a recent trend in drug advertising, in which
manufacturers preface the launch of a new drug with a “disease awareness” campaign
informing consumers about the condition that the new drug will treat, without naming the
drug. See Schwartz & Woloshin, supra note 5, at 82. The launch of a commercial after the
FDA’s approval of a new drug, under this proposal, would preserve the drug industry’s
introduction of that drug as a possible solution to the ailment. Beth Snyder Bulik,
Awareness Is In: DTC Disease Campaigns Surge in the U.S., FIERCEPHARMA (Jan. 25, 2019,
12:25 PM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/marketing/did-you-know-dtc-disease-aware
ness-soars-u-s-spending-and-placement-up [https://perma.cc/3ZMW-HVFV].
211 See Noah, supra note 52, at 97–98; cf. PhRMA Comment Letter, supra note
82, at 15–16 (recommending that any new risk categorizations be implemented across
the entire prescription drug regulatory framework).
212 See Ass’n of Magazine Media, supra note 185, at 10–11.
213 Id.
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website would facilitate that behavior.214 It would also balance
the manufacturer’s profit interests as a business and the
patient’s interests in complete and accurate information, by
allowing the manufacturer to make thorough claims and
disclosures on appropriate platforms.
As to enforcement, this note is silent on whether
Congress should also authorize the FDA to require changes
further to prereview of drug advertisements because it may not
be necessary in this proposed framework. This note rests instead
on the text of the proposed restrictions as sufficiently clear to
direct manufacturers to treat broadcast ads as distinctly limited
vehicles, integrated into a comprehensive advertising campaign
with print and web components. The question still remains
whether the FDA can undertake an exhaustive role in regulating
DTC advertisements. This note takes no position on how the
FDA would afford the personnel and resources to review
advertising campaigns in this framework, except to say that
Congress should, at the same stroke, enable the FDA to fulfill its
enhanced regulatory responsibilities.215 So long as these
commercials are as pervasive as they are today, the FDA must
be able to consistently regulate them, rather than “merely
scratching the surface in its efforts to improve the quality of
consumer information.”216
B.

Drug Industry Buy-In: Commercial Speech and Products
Liability in the Big Picture

Another consideration is whether the scope of this
restriction on a drug manufacturer’s DTC communications would
survive a First Amendment challenge.217 There are two answers
to this challenge: (1) satisfy a Central Hudson analysis; or (2)
persuade drug companies, especially if strict scrutiny ultimately
governs, that this restriction is in the industry’s best interest.218
Under Central Hudson, DTC advertisements are
protected commercial speech because they are lawful and not
214 See id. Another concern is the fact that much of the targeted audience—
consumers over 65 years of age, for example—may not be especially tech savvy and thus
rely on broadcast advertisements. Kaufman, supra note 22. In that case, it becomes even
more imperative that manufacturers refrain from overwhelming viewers with too much
efficacy and risk information in a brief broadcast, and redirect older patients to medical
professionals for that conversation.
215 See Vladeck, supra note 51, at 287. Congress may be able to accomplish this
by enhancing the FDA’s regulatory authority or directing more resources to the agency. Id.
216 Perry et al., supra note 12, at 768.
217 See Schwartz, supra note 199, at 18.
218 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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inherently misleading. Thus, for any speech regulation to pass
constitutional muster, the government must show that it has a
valid interest in the FDA’s authority to regulate DTC
advertisements and that the corresponding regulation is no
more restrictive than necessary.219 The government interest in
regulating DTC broadcast advertisements is valid: protecting
lay consumers, as unsophisticated listeners, from a barrage of
efficacy and risk information in a constrained medium,220 in
which the manufacturer does not even have a clear tort duty to
warn the viewer.221 This interest, put another way, is to force
consumers to rely on more comprehensive platforms, like print,
web, and doctor’s offices, for drug information.
While the FDA’s pending proposal may claim the same
governmental interest, the restricted product claims in this
framework are better tailored to this interest.222 The difficulty of
measuring the statutorily required fair balance of benefits and risks
in a broadcast grows as the volume of information increases; recent
studies show poor consumer retention of risk information when a
commercial discloses too many risks, while consumer retention
improves when less information is presented or important
information is emphasized.223 Here, the required balanced disclosure
would comprise the drug’s approved use and clearly defined risk
categories.224 Systematizing the messages and vocabulary in these
advertisements does not exceed the government’s interest here, and
even falls in line with the pharmaceutical industry’s own expressed
interests in consistency.225
To be clear, this restriction would not ban a company
from saying that a drug is effective.226 A rule that shifts claims
and disclosures away from constrained broadcast platforms to
other platforms undeniably restricts broadcast communications,
but actually serves to encourage more speech on more flexible

219 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see also supra Section I.C.
220 Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in Prescription Drug
Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements, 82 Fed. Reg. 39,598, 39,599 (Aug. 21,
2017); Friedman & Gould, supra note 4, at 106; Ass’n of Magazine Media, supra note
185, at 10–11; see also supra Sections I.C & II.B.
221 See supra Section II.C.1.
222 Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in Prescription Drug
Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 39,599.
223 Betts et al., supra note 17, at 957; Sivanathan & Kakkar, supra note 17, at 797.
224 See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(5) (2018).
225 See Eli Lilly & Co., supra note 175, at 2–3.
226 As mentioned before, the Supreme Court does not look favorably on outright
bans on commercial speech. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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platforms.227 The broadcast itself would serve as a testament to
the drug’s efficacy, since a company still would only be able to
advertise a drug for a specific use if its approval and labeling
explicitly indicate that the drug has satisfactorily demonstrated
efficacy.228 The broadcast then fulfills its purpose as a call to
action in a multifaceted advertising campaign, by directing the
viewer to more reliable sources of information, like the drug’s
website, print advertisements, or an actual doctor.229 In this way,
the restriction is not excessive, but rather, is tailored to define
appropriate vehicles for substantive pharmaceutical company
messages in a comprehensive campaign.230
If the Supreme Court dissolves the distinction between
commercial and non-commercial speech,231 it is not clear that
this proposal will survive strict scrutiny analysis. It will, at the
very least, intrigue drug companies looking to the future of
products liability theories as the market evolves.232 First, it
would bring the FDA’s DTC advertising regulations closer to
satisfying Levine’s high bar for implied conflict preemption.233
The codified restrictions on all permissible content in DTC
broadcast ads would not only set floors, but they would also
function as ceilings that would enable the FDA to require changes
to noncompliant ads.234 Each component establishes a requisite
floor for advertising practices, while a court would be able to
construe broadcast restrictions as a simultaneous ceiling on a
drug manufacturer’s permissible communications in this
context.235 These floors and ceilings would also lend themselves to
a regulatory compliance defense, working together to enforce
227 Cf. Vladeck, supra note 51, at 284–85 (describing how a ban limited to
broadcast DTC advertisements would still allow drug companies to “reach consumers
with print ads that, presumably, are more informative than brief broadcast ads”).
228 Cf. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(3), (6)(i) (limiting a drug manufacturer’s product
claims to what the FDA already approved in the labeling).
229 Cf. Content of Risk Information in the Major Statement in Prescription Drug
Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements, 82 Fed. Reg. 39,598, 39,599 (Aug. 21,
2017) (requiring disclosure that advertisement does not convey all of a drug’s risks and
adequate provision directing patients to printed or web materials).
230 See Ass’n of Magazine Media, supra note 185, at 6–7 (explaining how
“advertising is more effective the more channels that are used” and when different
formats complement each other).
231 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
232 Of course, this leaves any regulatory solution in the DTC sphere vulnerable
to any single manufacturer who endeavors to abolish the regime altogether. Since the
Supreme Court has not yet ruled as much, a regulatory framework that would survive
strict scrutiny is beyond the scope of this note.
233 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574–75 (2009); see also supra Section II.C.3.
234 See Schwartz et al., supra note 8, at 380.
235 See Levine, 555 U.S. at 575. By extension, depending on the language of
Congress’s authorizing statute, this expanded regulatory power could also be construed
as implied field preemption, leaving no room for state law standards of conduct in this
context. See HERRMANN & ALDEN, supra note 52, at 318–19.
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national standards of conduct that drug manufacturers could rely
on to plan their advertising campaigns before dissemination.236
Regardless of which solution the FDA pursues, consumer
access to the internet and social media, together with the
constraints of managed care, urgent care, and telemedicine on
the doctor-patient relationship, will put pressure on the learned
intermediary doctrine.237 This framework recognizes the
importance of the prescribing physician and minimizes any
perceived fiduciary relationship between the drug manufacturer
and the patient, by requiring the manufacturer to convey that it
is the doctor who assesses the patient and decides on a course of
treatment. Most cases have emphasized the centrality of the
learned intermediary—a patient’s physician as the ultimate
arbiter of the patient’s access to any advertised medications—in
withstanding ongoing pressure to reject the doctrine.238 Should
current market forces, however, be enough to reject the learned
intermediary doctrine, the advantages of bolstered regulatory
compliance and preemption defenses here exceed those of the
FDA’s other options.239 Combined with drug manufacturers’
interests in the credibility that FDA regulations afford their
advertisements, the improved viability of these litigation
doctrines may facilitate a First Amendment ceasefire between
the pharmaceutical industry and the FDA.
CONCLUSION
The FDA’s limited regulation of DTC prescription drug
advertisements has yielded commercials overflowing with
benefit and risk information that often is difficult for consumers
to comprehend.240 Commercials should not hasten a patient’s
insistence on getting (or stopping) a particular prescription.
Congress and the FDA must confront pressure to promote
effective advertising of a drug’s benefits and risks, especially
considering current regulatory constraints and inherently

236 See Tobias, supra note 86, at 1030 (explaining a court’s observation that a
presumption of regulatory compliance could be overcome “when the FDA imposed no
warning strictures”).
237 Yang & Chen, supra note 112, at 50; see supra notes 131–134 and
accompanying text.
238 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
239 Arnold, supra note 115 (demonstrating the resilience, with some exceptions,
of the learned intermediary doctrine as the field of medicine and DTC advertising
practices evolve); see supra Section III.A.
240 See supra Sections II.A–B.
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limited broadcast platforms, as well as consumers’ web access
and social media use.241
A reform should balance policy and legal considerations that
affect patients, doctors, drug manufacturers, and the FDA.
Restricted product claims offer a balance that other proposals do not.
As limited calls to action, these commercials will provide just enough
information to catch the attention of targeted patients and prompt
them to inquire further, on their own time and volition. This
approach not only informs patients, but also provides nationwide
floors and ceilings for DTC broadcast practices, while preserving a
manufacturer’s right to communicate with consumers.
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